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 Introducing the Issue
 Gordon Berlin, Frank F. Furstenbergjr., and Mary C. Waters
 That the schedule for coming of age has been
 rather sharply revised both in the United
 States and more broadly throughout the
 industrialized world is by now widely recog
 nized. Over the past decade, especially, the
 mass media have trumpeted the findings of a
 growing body of research showing that young
 people are taking longer to leave home, attain
 economic independence, and form families
 of their own than did their peers half a cen
 tury ago. The forces behind this new time
 table have been evident for several decades,
 but social science researchers, much less
 policy makers, were slow to recognize just
 how profound the change has been. A trickle
 of studies during the 1980s about the prolon
 gation of young adulthood grew to a steady
 stream during the 1990s and then to a torrent
 during the first decade of the new millen
 nium.1 Now that researchers have shown
 how and why the timetable for becoming an
 adult has altered, policy makers must rethink
 whether the social institutions that once suc
 cessfully educated, trained, and supported
 young adults are up to the task today.
 Changes in the coming-of-age schedule are, in
 fact, nothing new A century or more ago, the
 transition to adulthood was also a protracted
 affair. In an agriculture-based economy, it
 took many young adults some time to gain the
 wherewithal to leave home and form a family.
 Formal education was typically brief because
 most jobs were still related to farming, the
 trades, or the growing manufacturing sec
 tor. By their teens, most youth were gainfully
 employed, but they frequently remained at
 home for a time, contributing income to their
 families and building resources to enter mar
 riage and form a family.
 By contrast, after World War II, with oppor
 tunities for good jobs abundant, young
 Americans transitioned to adult roles quickly.
 In 1950, fewer than half of all Americans
 completed high school, much less attended
 college. Well-paying, often unionized jobs
 with benefits were widely available to males.
 The marriage rush and baby boom era at
 mid-century was stimulated not only by a
 longing to settle down after the war years but
 also by generous new government programs
 to help integrate veterans back into society.
 Today young adults take far longer to reach
 economic and social maturity than their
 contemporaries did five or six decades ago.
 In large part, this shift is attributable to the
 expansion of higher education beginning
 in the late 1960s. Employers have become
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 increasingly reluctant to hire young people
 without educational credentials. Failing to
 complete high school all but relegates indi
 viduals to a life of permanent penury; even
 completing high school is hardly enough to
 ensure reasonable prospects. Like it or not,
 at least some postsecondary education is
 increasingly necessary. In short, education
 has become an ever more potent source of
 social stratification, dividing the haves and
 the have-nots, a theme in this volume to
 which we will return.
 Many observers, especially
 in the mass media, worry
 that this new timetable for
 adulthood has created a
 growing sense of entitlement
 and a lingering pattern of
 dependency.
 The boom in higher education is not the
 only reason why young adults are taking
 more time to gain independence from their
 families and establish themselves in adult
 roles. The schedule for growing up, no doubt,
 has been affected by the lengthening of the
 life span over the past century. Most young
 adults today can expect to live into their late
 seventies, a decade longer than their coun
 terparts even fifty years ago. It makes sense
 to continue investing into the third and even
 fourth decades of life when one can expect to
 live another fifty years or more.
 Cultural changes, such as the post-1960s shift
 in sexual attitudes and practices, have also
 slowed what was once a rush into adult roles.
 Fifty years ago, premarital sex was still highly
 stigmatized. Although the stigma did not
 deter many young couples from breaching
 the norms, marriage served as a safety net in
 the event of a premarital pregnancy. Today,
 most young people expect to have sex before
 marriage and have the means to prevent
 unwanted childbearing. Their contraceptive
 efforts are still imperfect, but the point is
 that they need not marry to have sex, and
 they will not necessarily become pregnant
 when they do.
 The past several decades, then, have wit
 nessed a big change in how and when youth
 take on adult roles?to put it another way,
 another notable shift in the "normal" pattern
 of moving from adolescence to adulthood.
 Although todays delayed schedule is reminis
 cent of the pattern a century ago, however,
 the two are fundamentally different. Today,
 young people (unless they are the children of
 recent immigrants) rarely contribute earn
 ings to the household; by and large, they
 are either fully or partially beholden to their
 parents for support while they complete their
 schooling and find a foothold in the labor
 force. Typically, they defer marriage in favor
 of cohabitation even when they do leave the
 natal household.
 Although today s young adults and their
 parents value independence highly, both
 tolerate and even endorse a slower schedule
 for attaining economic and social maturity.
 In effect, what is becoming normal, if not
 normative, is that the age of eighteen, or
 even twenty-one, has lost its significance as
 a marker of adult status. The transition to
 adulthood is drawn out over a span of nearly
 a decade and consists of a series of smaller
 steps rather than a single swift and coordi
 nated one. Moreover, the social construction
 of adulthood seems to rely much less on the
 traditional demographic markers?home
 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
This content downloaded from 165.123.108.74 on Wed, 07 Jun 2017 18:32:35 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Introducing the Issue
 leaving, full-time work, and family forma
 tion?and more on personal psychological
 self-assessments of "maturity." At any rate,
 the traditional markers do not any longer
 stand for attaining adulthood.
 Many observers, especially in the mass media,
 worry that this new timetable for adulthood
 has created a growing sense of entitlement
 and a lingering pattern of dependency. Much
 of the evidence, however, points to a dif
 ferent conclusion: attaining adult roles (as
 measured by independence from the natal
 family, union formation, and parenthood) is
 simply more difficult than it was, especially
 three or four decades ago. In fact, the vast
 majority of young adults in their late teens
 and early twenties are not at leisure?they are
 working, going to school, or doing both at the
 same time. Many unemployed and underedu
 cated young people are desperate to work but
 cannot secure stable employment or make
 enough money to live on their own. Although
 they probably do receive support from their
 families during this period of semi-autonomy,
 most do not exhibit the signs of entitlement
 that are frequently ascribed to them.
 The nation s young adults are highly unlikely
 to return any time soon to the schedule for
 growing up that was normative among their
 parents and grandparents. The conditions
 driving the shift in the schedule are likely to
 be long-lasting. Policy makers must therefore
 begin to rethink and renovate the social insti
 tutions that were suited to the past, a time
 when the age of eighteen or twenty-one signi
 fied something different than it does today.
 Understanding the New Schedule
 Concern about the mismatch between the
 new realities of coming of age and the social
 institutions that once successfully supported
 young people moving toward adulthood gave
 rise, in 1999, to the MacArthur Network on
 Adult Transitions and Public Policy. The
 Network, a team of twelve researchers from
 diverse social science disciplines, began its
 work by assessing the demographic, economic,
 sociological, and psychological evidence on
 adult transitions to learn what had changed
 and why. In a series of recent publications, the
 Network has documented that the changes in
 the timing, sequencing, and even attainment
 of adult roles have indeed been substantial and
 that they are affecting young adults in varying
 socioeconomic circumstances quite different
 ly.2 Drawing on both quantitative and qualita
 tive data in the initial phase of its work, the
 Network reported that young adults between
 the ages of eighteen and thirty-four are
 employing some familiar and some different
 strategies than those that their parents and
 grandparents used to make a successful
 transition to adult work and family roles. In
 particular, young adults and their families are
 much more skeptical about the wisdom of
 early transitions to work and marriage, even
 taking into account geographical, religious,
 and socioeconomic differences. The Network
 also discovered that gender differences in the
 timing of adult transitions had virtually
 disappeared.3 By contrast, differences by
 social class have, if anything, become more
 pronounced.
 These changes coincided with and were
 reinforced by a wave of immigration during
 the 1980s that attracted many young adult
 immigrants as well as immigrant families to
 the United States. These immigrants have
 imported traditional family practices while
 simultaneously demonstrating a high level of
 adaptation to American ways. First-generation
 immigrants often arrive as young adults?the
 peak age period for immigration. Social
 ized in their sending society, they enter the
 United States seeking work and are often cut
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 off from their parents and extended family.
 They achieve independence very young and
 are more likely to be in the labor force than
 native-born Americans of the same age and
 educational background. Second-generation
 immigrants?native-born children of immi
 grants?are more likely to live at home as
 young adults than are comparable natives, and
 they achieve higher levels of education than
 natives of similar socioeconomic backgrounds.
 As a result they have more extended transi
 tions to adulthood than both their parents and
 comparable native-born Americans.
 Network researchers then turned to the chal
 lenging task of examining some of the institu
 tions that house and serve young adults?the
 family, higher education, the workplace, the
 community, and, for a group of especially
 vulnerable youth, the juvenile justice, foster
 care, and related systems. The aim of the
 second phase of the research program was to
 assess the ability of each of these institutions
 to support young adults in their quest for
 economic independence, intimacy, and civic
 responsibility?goals widely shared among
 both young adults and their parents. This
 volume of The Future of Children provides
 a summary of research findings to date and
 suggests policy steps that could make these
 institutions more effective.
 How Well Do Traditional
 Supports Work?
 One important if not unexpected finding
 of the Network was that existing institu
 tions work much better for affluent young
 adults than they do for most others. Family
 resources and the opportunities they afford
 have become more central to educational
 attainment. And, with educational attainment
 an increasingly potent predictor of economic
 success and stable family life, growing levels
 of inequality have created an ever larger
 chasm between the affluent third (roughly
 corresponding to college graduates) and
 the rest of the population. The economic
 burden on families, particularly those in the
 bottom two-thirds of the income distribu
 tion, has been growing far more rapidly than
 their capacity to undertake a longer and
 more expensive period of investment in their
 children's futures. Increasingly, parents are
 being asked to take on the costs of education,
 health care, and, often, support of children in
 their early twenties (and often later).
 Although parents of all social strata seem to
 understand and accept the new schedule for
 growing up, middle- and lower-income
 parents are ill-equipped to handle the costs
 entailed, and the result is a sharply tilted
 playing field for young adult development.
 The new demands of supporting young adults
 for longer periods create impossible burdens
 for lower-income households and pose
 serious problems for all parents who must
 balance the need to make increased financial
 (and emotional) investments in their adult
 children against the need to ensure their own
 retirements. This privatized approach to
 investment in the nation s young is quite
 different from the accepted public approach
 to education for children below the age of
 eighteen.
 Health care represents a glaring example of
 how the nation s public arrangements sim
 ply do not work for young adults who follow
 the new schedule for coming of age. Todays
 health care system more or less protects
 low-income children up to age eighteen, or
 in some instances twenty-one, but it does
 nothing for older youth who lack work-based
 or school-based health insurance. All but
 the most affluent parents are frustrated in
 their efforts to fill the health insurance gap.
 The pending health care bill, if passed by
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 Congress and signed by the president, will go
 a long way toward correcting the problem.
 The new public-private approach to support
 ing higher education is equally problematic.
 Parents of modest means are hard-pressed to
 help their children obtain a college educa
 tion. Although, as described in several articles
 in this volume, the nation makes both grants
 and loans available to low-income students,
 the process for applying for that money?and
 for finding out how large the grant or loan
 would be?is complex, intimidating, and
 cumbersome. As a result, many low-income
 students simply do not apply. Others end
 up borrowing and eventually owe consider
 able amounts of money or try to put them
 selves through school by working. These two
 options may not represent a problem for
 low- and moderate-income families whose
 children are well-prepared for college. But
 many youth from these families grow up in
 areas with poorly functioning school systems
 and are ill-prepared to make the transition
 to college. Without adequate economic and
 social support, they may flounder in the
 transition to college, creating a nightmare
 scenario where they fail to get a degree that
 enables them to repay their educational
 debts. Although the educational burdens
 on upper-income families are considerable,
 these parents are better equipped to help
 meet the costs of higher education, and their
 children are better prepared to succeed in
 college. Here too recent efforts to amend the
 student financial aid system and to increase
 Pell Grants and other sources of support
 could help to address these challenges for
 low- and moderate-income families.
 Once students arrive at college, they tend to
 receive strikingly different levels of support
 depending on their economic background.
 Most four-year residential institutions, which
 are largely populated by relatively affluent
 youth, are extremely well-suited to assist
 young adults in transition. They provide
 orientations for incoming students and their
 families, an array of services and counseling
 should students encounter problems, men
 toring delivered by older students, recre
 ational and extracurricular programs, health
 and mental health services, and, of course,
 residences. Students who get off track receive
 academic and emotional guidance. Many of
 these colleges and universities even offer
 career counseling and job placement for
 graduates. Furthermore, these institutions
 are conveniently linked to postgraduate
 education programs that are, generally
 speaking, similarly well-designed for youth in
 their mid- and late-twenties.
 By contrast, the two-year community colleges
 that less affluent students are likely to attend
 are typically bare-bones institutions stretched
 thin by a myriad of demands and insuffi
 cient resources. Although potentially useful
 portals of entry for students hoping to move
 on to a four-year college, a skilled job, or a
 semi-profession that requires an associate s
 degree or a licensing exam, many two-year
 colleges lack the most basic amenities offered
 by a four-year residential college or even a
 four-year commuter school. Campus life is
 frequently limited, and the services afforded
 are meager or nonexistent. Students, often
 unprepared and overcommitted by outside
 obligations, pose serious challenges to the
 sometimes underpaid, overburdened faculty
 and administrators. Rather than serving as
 beacons of opportunity, too many of these
 two-year colleges are revolving doors through
 which students wander aimlessly in search of
 future direction. Indeed, research supported
 by the U.S. Department of Education shows
 that close to half of students who enter a
 community college do not earn a degree and
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 are not enrolled in any other postsecondary
 institution six years later.
 In collaboration with MDRC, Network
 researchers undertook an assessment of
 how community colleges could realize their
 mission of providing academic training to
 allow students to get a degree or secure a
 job that might be otherwise unattainable
 without special training. Analysts examined
 several programs aimed at improving student
 outcomes, including changes in instructional
 practices, enhancements to student services,
 and increases in financial support. Although
 not all the programs were successful, some
 led to significant improvements in students'
 academic performance and persistence.
 The findings, as presented in the article in
 this volume by Thomas Brock, suggest that
 policy makers and educators need not accept
 high dropout rates as a given. Rather, by
 making changes in institutional practices?
 including new forms of flexible financial aid
 that incentivize and reward students who get
 good grades and complete courses, as well as
 innovative "learning community" programs
 that integrate courses and create study peer
 groups?they can boost the odds that more
 young people will earn college degrees and
 succeed in the labor market.
 During the middle decades of the twentieth
 century and extending through the Vietnam
 War, military service represented an attrac
 tive possibility for youth who were not college
 bound. It provided, as Ryan Kelty, Meredith
 Kleykamp, and David R. Segal report in their
 article in this volume, an effective bridge
 from high school to work for a large number
 of young men who lacked vocational direc
 tion. Although the military continues today
 to provide a supportive environment for men
 and women who want to serve their country,
 leave home, and get training, it is increasingly
 meant to provide a military career rather
 than a transition to the civilian labor market.
 Smaller and more select than the draft-era
 military, today s military is disinclined to
 afford training to youth who may exhibit
 educational deficits. Other youth-oriented
 institutions could learn much from the way
 the military trains and supports young adults,
 but the military itself is no longer a significant
 remedial institution for poorly functioning
 young adults.
 Countless studies have
 assessed and evaluated the
 effect of service corps of
 various types. One rigorous
 study concluded that they can
 and often do play a useful role.
 From the Depression-era s Civilian Conser
 vation Corps, to the Great Society's Peace
 Corps and VISTA, to the 1980s state and
 urban conservation corps, and to the 1990s
 Corporation for National and Community
 Service and its dramatic expansion in the
 Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act
 of 2009, policy makers have experimented
 episodically with institutions that serve the
 community while providing training and
 experience for young people who are unem
 ployable or who simply want to gain skills,
 serve the community, or move on to indepen
 dent living. Countless studies have assessed
 and evaluated the effect of service corps of
 various types. One rigorous study concluded
 that they can and often do play a useful
 role in providing time and space for young
 people to gain experience, acquire useful
 work skills and direction, and build a sense
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 of commitment to the larger community. If
 such results can be extended and built on by
 the Serve America Act, community service
 programs could begin to reach the scale
 needed to provide a new "institution" to help
 meet the needs of youth making the extended
 transition to adulthood.
 Often coming as a year-long experience
 between high school and college or work, or as
 a year off during or after college, youth service
 programs could be a valuable bridging pro
 gram with double social utility. Through these
 programs, young people do important work in
 their local communities?in hospitals, schools,
 and other public and nonprofit settings?
 and gain many experiences needed to make
 a successful transition to adulthood. In the
 long-standing debate about the pros and cons
 of mandatory national service for all, the pas
 sage of the Serve America Act may signal a
 commitment to build a voluntary, as opposed
 to a mandatory, system of opportunities for
 a diverse group of young people. This signal
 notwithstanding, unless concrete steps are
 taken to build the capacity of service models
 that work, to collect evidence of their ongoing
 effectiveness, and to build a record of their
 accomplishments?much as the WPAs accom
 plishments were documented and remain for
 all to see in the nation s parks and other struc
 tures?history suggests that expansion could
 be followed by contraction. After all, it was
 only a few short years ago that the Corporation
 for National and Community Service survived
 a near-death experience in Congress. But this
 time, getting it right may matter more than it
 has in the past, given the dearth of institutions
 to help meet the demands of a lengthened
 transition to adulthood.
 Some proportion of young adults?those
 exiting foster care; youth in special educa
 tion or with physical, emotional, or cognitive
 limitations; the homeless; and the many
 exiting jail or prison?are at much higher risk
 in the transition to adulthood. Because these
 populations often overlap, however, it is hard
 to estimate their number precisely. Most
 experts believe that the share of youth who
 are at risk of encountering serious problems
 is significant. The vast majority come from
 poor and near-poor families that are dispro
 portionately African American and Latino.
 Much of the Network s attention has been
 focused on the very expensive systems that
 serve these vulnerable populations as chil
 dren?foster care, juvenile justice, special
 education, and social security disability. No
 easy or cost-free solutions are available to
 help these youth improve their prospects
 as young adults. Early detection of youths
 with problems, better schooling, and better
 alternatives to foster care and incarcera
 tion could reduce the share that enters early
 adulthood without the requisite skills to take
 advantage of educational opportunities and
 eventually find good jobs. But even with the
 best schooling and most effective preventive
 and ameliorative services, another challenge
 would be how to integrate the diverse sys
 tems that serve vulnerable youth. In addition,
 these youth often lack the family supports
 that other young people have as they age
 into young adulthood. The failure of existing
 institutions to adapt to current realities and
 the dearth of new institutions to serve young
 people without family supports are huge
 problems, as many of these young adults at
 risk will face lifelong problems that must be
 paid for one way or another.
 The Changing Nature of
 Young Adulthood
 The premise of this issue of The Future of
 Children is that the nation s public policy and
 its social institutions fail to reflect the realities
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 of the new transition to adulthood?and thus
 do not adequately serve the needs of young
 adults. Although each article in the volume
 opens with a full summary, in this section
 we briefly highlight some of the findings we
 think are the most important.
 Overview
 Richard Settersten of Oregon State Univer
 sity and Barbara Ray of Hired Pen, inc., open
 the issue by surveying the changes that have
 taken place over the past few decades in the
 timing and sequencing of young adulthood.
 They describe the later age at marriage, the
 rise in the number of young people living
 at home with their parents into their twen
 ties, and the longer period of time young
 people are staying in school. They stress
 that these changes create strains not only on
 the families of young adults but also on the
 institutions?colleges and universities, the
 military, youth service organizations, and the
 work setting?that have traditionally sup
 ported them. Noting that these institutions
 are not designed for this new pattern of life
 choices, Settersten and Ray raise the ques
 tion of whether the risks and costs newly
 associated with the early adult years should
 be borne privately by families or publicly by
 government. They also point out that despite
 the problems it creates, the lengthening
 transition to adulthood creates opportunities
 for some young people, especially those from
 more affluent backgrounds, to explore careers
 and lifestyles before settling into traditional
 adult roles.
 Immigration
 One of the most notable changes in Ameri
 can young adulthood is a demographic one.
 Young adults today are remarkably ethnically
 and racially diverse, owing in no small part to
 the enormous volume of immigration during
 the past four decades that has swelled the
 ranks of first- and second-generation immi
 grants and children of immigrants. Rub?n
 Rumbaut and Golnaz Komaie of the Uni
 versity of California-Irvine document these
 demographic changes and explore the ways
 in which generation and national origin shape
 the experience of young adulthood. The first
 generation of immigrants, having arrived
 in this country as young adults themselves,
 are the least likely of all young adults in the
 United States aged eighteen to thirty-four to
 live in their parents' households. They are
 also the least likely to be attending school,
 but the most likely to be working full time, to
 be married, and to have children. By contrast,
 the second generation is the most likely to
 live in the natal household and to be attend
 ing school between eighteen and thirty-four;
 they are by far the least likely to be married
 and to have children. In addition to these vast
 differences between the generations, immi
 grant groups also experience gaps in social,
 economic, and legal status that are even
 greater than the gaps between native whites
 and blacks. Sizable segments of immigrant
 youth, especially the undocumented and the
 less-educated poor, face structural barriers
 in their transitions to adulthood, and the
 authors discuss possible policy options to deal
 with those barriers.
 Family Changes
 Frank Furstenberg of the University of Penn
 sylvania surveys the important family changes
 that characterize the transition to adulthood.
 He notes that both patterns of family forma
 tion and the shape of the family have changed
 often in American history and that the period
 often used as a benchmark for measuring
 family change?that immediately after World
 War II?was in reality an anomaly in the
 long sweep of family history, notable for its
 very early pattern of attaining such markers
 of adulthood as employment, marriage, and
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 childbearing. It should therefore come as no
 surprise that U.S. family formation patterns
 today differ dramatically from those of fifty
 years ago. Young adults are on average mar
 rying later, and a substantial fraction, not at
 all. Cohabitation has become increasingly
 acceptable as an alternative to marriage, and
 the average age of childbearing has risen.
 Furstenberg documents two major trends in
 these family formation patterns. First, gender
 equality has increased, with men and women
 growing more alike in the age at which they
 leave home, marry, and have children. And,
 second, class inequality has grown substan
 tially, with lower-income young people less
 likely to follow an orderly and predictable
 sequence of education, full-time employ
 ment, home-leaving, marriage, and parent
 hood. Higher-income young adults are more
 likely to follow the traditional sequence, but
 they take longer to complete it and often
 must go through an extended period of
 financial dependence on parents while they
 complete their education. The share of young
 adults residing with parents has risen since
 the 1960s, when adult transitions started at
 an earlier age. Furstenberg argues that the
 popular media often portray these changes
 as objectionable for parents and young adult
 children, but the few studies to examine this
 question find that parents and young adults
 accommodate well to the new schedule.
 As a result of delays in establishing them
 selves financially, young people tend to
 depend longer on their families of origin.
 Although all industrialized countries have
 experienced this same pattern, the U.S. wel
 fare state is relatively undeveloped, meaning
 that the burden of supporting young adults
 falls more heavily on American families.
 Furstenberg calls for further research on how
 families are managing these new demands
 and warns that the need for active parenting
 extending into their children's twenties and
 even thirties may discourage people from
 becoming parents in the first place, leading
 to a trend toward lower fertility, especially
 among more affluent families.
 Second Chances for High School
 Dropouts
 The American labor market has little to
 offer workers who do not complete high
 school, and at least some college is increas
 ingly required to attain a well-paying job.
 Yet somewhere between 9 and 16 percent
 of young people aged sixteen to twenty-four
 have not completed high school. Over the
 past several decades a variety of "second
 chance" programs have been developed to
 help dropouts finish high school or obtain a
 General Educational Development (GED)
 credential and get a foothold in the labor
 market. Dan Bloom of MDRC reviews the
 types of programs available, as well as their
 efficacy, and then considers their implications
 for the transition to adulthood. Although he
 notes that it is difficult to prove that the col
 lapse of the job market for high school drop
 outs over the past several decades caused the
 steep decline in the share of dropouts who
 marry?from 68 percent of men aged twenty
 two to thirty-two in 1970 to only 26 percent
 in 2007?the two trends certainly reflect each
 other. Bloom surveys eleven major programs
 intended for young dropouts, dividing them
 into three categories?work programs, train
 ing and education programs, and mandatory,
 welfare-based programs for teen mothers. All
 have been evaluated using rigorous random
 assignment techniques. Though the evalu
 ation findings are mixed, they show at least
 short-term modest effects for many of the
 programs. Bloom also cites descriptive stud
 ies showing that young people who obtain a
 GED tend to do relatively poorly in the labor
 market, in part because they are much less
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 likely to pursue postsecondary education than
 those who get a high school degree. Based on
 these findings, Bloom proposes three focuses
 for future research and policy; strengthening
 programs for youth who voluntarily seek to
 continue their education or find jobs, includ
 ing building tighter links between GED
 preparation programs and postsecondary
 occupational certificate programs; identifying
 strategies to engage disconnected youth who
 are unlikely to volunteer for programs such as
 the Job Corps; and analyzing local systems to
 support disconnected youth.
 Improving Higher Education Outcomes
 Even though the value of a college educa
 tion has increased markedly over the past
 forty years, with college graduates earning
 1.8 times as much as high school graduates,
 college graduation rates have not improved
 in decades, largely because students' rates of
 persistence to a degree have not improved.
 The five-year college graduation rate is 60
 percent at four-year colleges, but only 32
 percent at community colleges. The low com
 munity college graduation rate is a growing
 concern, because more than a third of all
 college students attend two-year colleges.
 Meanwhile, access to college has improved
 substantially, with the share of women on
 campus catching up to and surpassing that
 of men and the share of nonwhite college
 students doubling in the past two decades.
 Thomas Brock of MDRC outlines these
 trends in college attendance and persistence
 and reviews the research on interventions
 aimed at improving college outcomes for
 young adults. The changing nature of young
 adulthood, with more youth combining work,
 school, and parenthood, results in a diverse
 college student population?one that is older,
 more part time, and more likely to attend
 episodically than has been conventional until
 recently. Indeed, Brock reports that only 27
 percent of current undergraduates are "tradi
 tional students" who attend full time imme
 diately following high school and who rely on
 parents for financial support. Of all under
 graduates in 1999-2000, 28 percent were
 highly nontraditional?in their twenties or
 older, combining work with school, and rais
 ing children. And nontraditional students are
 much less likely than traditional students to
 persist to a degree. Brock surveys a number
 of interventions that have been evaluated by
 rigorous random-assignment design. Among
 the more promising interventions are reme
 dial education courses that foster more stu
 dent engagement and belonging on campus,
 enhanced student services such as counseling
 and support, and performance-based schol
 arships that tie financial incentives to suc
 cessful course completion. Brock concludes
 that many of the interventions show modest
 positive effects and that performance-based
 scholarships show pronounced positive
 effects. Although many people believe that
 making federal financial aid more effective
 will also increase persistence, surprisingly
 little systematic research has addressed that
 question. One clear finding is that simplifying
 the application form for federal financial aid
 (FAFSA) has a substantial payoff in increas
 ing college enrollment.
 The Labor Market
 One of the key markers of the transition to
 adulthood, and arguably one necessary for
 success, is finding stable and well-paying
 employment. Dramatic changes in the labor
 market in recent decades, however, have
 complicated young people s prospects of
 finding such employment. In their survey of
 the labor market and the transition to adult
 hood, Sheldon Danziger and David Ratner
 of the University of Michigan contend that
 young people now must struggle to attain
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 financial independence?a development with
 implications in other areas. Although it can
 not be proved, for example, that the delay in
 achieving financial independence has caused
 delays in leaving home and in marrying, these
 trends are correlated.
 Even though the value of
 a college education has
 increased markedly over
 the past forty years, college
 graduation rates have not
 improved in decades, largely
 because students' rates of
 persistence to a degree have
 not improved.
 Danziger and Ratner stress that gender
 plays an important part in the story of the
 labor market. The prospects of young men,
 especially less-educated young men, have
 declined precipitously, while more young
 women are working and their earnings have
 increased relative both to inflation and to
 the earnings of young men. The median
 annual earnings (in constant 2007 dollars)
 of men between the ages of twenty-five and
 thirty-four who worked at some time dur
 ing the year fell 21 percent between 1973
 and 2007, whereas the median earnings of
 women rose 62 percent. Job turnover?
 what economists call "churning"?has also
 increased dramatically. The fraction of
 individuals in jobs lasting less than one year
 has risen faster for younger than for older
 workers. The share of workers in longer-term
 jobs declined precipitously for men, while
 holding steady for women. Employment for
 men with the least education also fell dur
 ing the past few decades, with the sharpest
 declines for African American men with less
 than a high school education. Because of the
 increasing labor market returns to educa
 tion and the importance of postsecondary
 education for employment, Danziger and
 Ratner recommend programs that increase
 educational attainment, including early child
 hood education and second-chance programs
 such as those described by Dan Bloom.
 They also support raising the minimum
 wage and expanding the earned income tax
 credit (EITC), both of which could raise the
 incomes of workers at the lower end of the
 distribution.
 Civic Participation
 In their article on civic participation, Con
 stance Flanagan of Penn State University and
 Peter Levine of Tufts University reinforce
 a theme running throughout the volume?
 the ways in which class, race, and immigrant
 status shape very different patterns in young
 adulthood. They find that more affluent
 young people are more likely to be civically
 engaged than the less affluent, both in terms
 of political activity such as voting and in
 terms of volunteering. This civic divide is a
 consequence both of cumulative disadvan
 tage in the pre-adult years and of a dearth of
 institutional opportunities for young adults
 who are not in college. The authors argue
 that young adulthood is a critical period
 for forming political beliefs and behaviors,
 and they trace the ways in which an elon
 gated transition to adulthood might provide
 opportunities for increased civic engagement
 among young people. They also trace gen
 erational differences in political attitudes and
 behaviors and suggest that young people in
 more recent cohorts may be shifting to more
 active engagement.
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 The Military
 Although only a small fraction of U.S. young
 adults serve in the nation s all-volunteer mili
 tary, young adults are very much the focus of
 the military, because the majority of military
 personnel fall into this age group. In their
 article on young adulthood and the military,
 Ryan Kelty of Washington College, Meredith
 Kleykamp of the University of Kansas, and
 David R. Segal of the University of Maryland
 explain that in periods of mass conscription,
 such as during World War II, the military
 is for most people a hiatus between adoles
 cence and adulthood. By contrast, today's
 all-volunteer military is more likely to be a
 period of active transition into young adult
 hood and, often, into a career in the military.
 The military's new, more career-oriented sys
 tem has led it to implement a number of poli
 cies to cope with the family needs of young
 adults. Indeed Kelty, Kleykamp, and Segal
 document the ample material support the
 military provides to young adults?reason
 able wages, generous in-kind transfers, free
 medical care, housing, educational benefits,
 and training designed to promote responsible
 membership in intimate relationships and the
 wider community. As a result, the pattern of
 family formation in the military is earlier and
 more stable than it is among civilians of the
 same age. The majority of enlisted person
 nel are parents, and the racial differences in
 family formation that exist among civilians do
 not characterize the military. No black-white
 gap in marriage exists among military person
 nel. The transition to adulthood, including
 economic independence from parents, is thus
 much more stable and orderly for military
 personnel.
 Kelty, Kleykamp, and Segal note that much
 about what the military does cannot easily
 be replicated in the wider society. As an
 institution, the military has unique control
 over young adult behavior through its code of
 conduct. It also restricts who can enlist,
 barring openly homosexual personnel,
 restricting the occupations available to
 women within the military, drawing recruits
 who have high school diplomas, and refusing
 to enlist high school dropouts or people with
 criminal records. The authors also note that
 the military in a time of war holds dangers for
 young adults, most especially in the long-run
 effects of injuries, both psychological and
 physical, from the war and the long-run
 effects of the physical and symbolic violence
 women experience in a male-dominated
 institution.
 Justice System and Social Services
 All the articles in this volume stress the
 varying needs of young adults and the ways in
 which young people with fewer financial
 resources, less education, and less support
 from their families of origin have a harder
 time than their more affluent peers in making
 a successful transition to independent
 adulthood. The point holds particularly true
 in the case of vulnerable youth?defined by
 D. Wayne Osgood and E. Michael Foster of
 Penn State University and Mark E. Courtney
 of the University of Washington as those
 involved in the social service, health, and
 justice systems in childhood and adolescence.
 The authors survey the special challenges
 faced by youth involved in the mental health
 system, the foster care system, the juvenile
 justice system, the criminal justice system,
 special education, and the health care system,
 as well as runaway and homeless youth.
 Although noting that these populations
 overlap and that many young people need
 services from multiple systems, Osgood,
 Foster, and Courtney show that the categori
 cal ways in which state and federal funding
 for these systems are designed often keep
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 these issues compartmentalized and prevent
 service providers from seeing or helping the
 whole person. The authors explain that at age
 eighteen or twenty-one, young people age
 out of more supportive and inclusive systems
 designed for children to either no services or
 services with less support designed for adults.
 Many of these systems still function as if
 youth become independent adults overnight,
 and they are at odds with the longer period of
 semi-autonomy that characterizes young
 adulthood today. The authors point to the
 poor outcomes among these vulnerable youth
 and stress the need to redesign targeted
 services for them. They also argue that
 universal programs for all young adults would
 greatly benefit vulnerable populations.
 Finally, they highlight recent promising
 policy developments such as the 2008
 Fostering Connections Act, which extends
 government responsibility for youth in foster
 care from age eighteen to age twenty-one,
 and the Shared Youth Vision Initiative,
 designed to improve and coordinate systems
 that serve vulnerable youth as they transition
 to adulthood.
 Key Policy Issues
 The Network s research has revealed three
 urgent policy issues. The first is the twin
 problem of access and persistence in higher
 education, especially at the nation s com
 munity colleges. In response to findings from
 research, some of it supported by this Net
 work, federal policy makers are moving rap
 idly and forcefully to strengthen these critical
 institutions that bridge the gap between a
 generation ill-prepared for college-level work
 and a labor market that is demanding ever
 more complex skills.
 The second pressing need is to design and
 implement effective new programs to identify
 and prepare at-risk youth for the transition.
 Such programs, for example, would help
 young people to complete their secondary
 education so that they are better prepared to
 take the next step, whether directly into the
 labor force, into military service or alternative
 forms of service, or into higher education.
 Although the Networks focus was on the
 period of adult transitions (age eighteen to
 thirty-four), one signal research effort was an
 evaluation of ChalleNGe, a unique program
 developed by the National Guard to provide
 an alternative for high school dropouts
 between the ages of sixteen and eighteen.
 The program intervenes early to help these
 young people complete high school or obtain
 a GED during a five-month military-academy
 style residential program that emphasizes
 schooling, service, leadership, and healthy
 living among other skills needed in adulthood.
 After youth complete the residential portion
 of the program, trained mentors work with
 them in their own communities over the next
 twelve months to effectuate a successful
 transition to postsecondary education, work,
 or military service. As the articles in this
 volume by Dan Bloom and by Sheldon
 Danziger and David Ratner demonstrate, the
 consequences of school dropout are devastat
 ing to the long-term transition to adulthood.
 Early evaluation results from a randomized
 controlled trial of the ChalleNGe program
 present encouraging evidence that the
 program could offer valuable lessons for
 tackling this difficult set of problems.
 The third policy priority is diagnosing and
 attending to the problems of especially
 vulnerable youth and the systems that serve
 them, like foster care and juvenile justice,
 and rethinking how the nation might build a
 better integrated system of care. The list of
 systemic issues is long. One key problem is
 the failure to coordinate among systems that
 often define their jurisdiction narrowly,
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 especially when young people are known to
 more than one system and when needs
 overlap. Another is conflicting missions and
 funding sources. Yet another is the age at
 which services end?a crucial issue at a time
 of lengthening transitions to adulthood.
 Although families with means are extending
 help to their children well into their twenties
 and beyond, the special education, foster
 care, juvenile justice after-care, and related
 systems end service eligibility abruptly, often
 at age eighteen and only rarely much past age
 twenty-one. Promising strategies would
 reward collaboration and coordination,
 extend the reach of these systems well into
 adulthood, strengthen existing services and
 develop new ones to meet the special devel
 opmental needs of vulnerable youth at this
 stage of life, and better integrate services
 with those from more mainstream systems.
 Examples include building links to programs
 like ChalleNGe for foster care youth who
 drop out of school or facilitating access to
 community colleges and four-year colleges
 when skills permit. Here too, policy makers
 are beginning to recognize the need for
 change?witness the passage in 2008 of
 federal legislation extending services in the
 foster care system from age eighteen to
 twenty-one. Other efforts to coordinate these
 systems at the federal level are also under
 way. But more remains to be done. One way
 to stimulate change would be to free a few
 willing states from federally imposed categor
 ical restrictions and ask them to experiment
 with integrated systems of care geared to
 making mainstream links and providing
 supports that extend into adulthood.
 In sum, when the Research Network on
 Transitions to Adulthood and Public Policy
 began its work more than a decade ago, the
 lengthening of the transition and the concept
 of early adulthood as a distinct stage in
 human development were only dimly per
 ceived. As a result, the real and tangled
 implications of young people taking a decade
 or more after leaving high school to attain the
 markers commonly associated with adult
 hood?full-time work, an independent
 household, a stable relationship with a
 significant other in marriage or cohabitation,
 child-rearing, civic engagement, and, increas
 ingly in the twenty-first century, at least some
 postsecondary education or training?were
 only poorly understood.
 Research uncovered several important
 consequences of the extended transition.
 The first was the growing burden placed on
 the middle- and lower-income families who
 were providing their children with school
 ing, housing, health insurance, and income
 well beyond the age range of eighteen to
 twenty-one, the traditional age of majority.
 Instead of saving for retirement, or meeting
 their own needs, parents found themselves
 continuing to invest in their children's future.
 The second consequence was the unexpected
 strain being imposed on key social institu
 tions. Many young adults found themselves
 without health insurance and with few viable
 options to obtain it. Colleges often labeled
 students who came back to school later in life
 as "nontraditional," when in fact taking time
 off to work, see the world, or volunteer was
 increasingly the norm and not the exception
 for young adults. And the academic, financial,
 social, and emotional needs of this new breed
 of students differed from those of fresh
 out-of-high-school students. Third, few new
 institutional options were available to pro
 mote development at this stage of life. Youth
 corps and other volunteer programs existed,
 but the total number of slots available was
 generally small. Possibly most consequential
 of all, children in the care of the state?foster
 care, special education, the juvenile justice
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 system?had been particularly hard hit by
 the new transition. These social systems con
 tinued to end their support abruptly at age
 eighteen, even while low- and middle-income
 families were increasingly stepping in to help
 their more advantaged young adult children
 weather a longer transition. In effect, the
 most disadvantaged?those least able to
 adapt and most in need of transitional help
 well into adulthood?had been left "on their
 own without a net."
 A decade later, as the articles in this volume
 testify, recognition and change are in the
 air. While families still bear the brunt of the
 burden and institutions have not completely
 made the transition, policy and practice are
 now both astir. Out of necessity, to attract
 and hold a volunteer army, the military has
 made a number of changes to encourage and
 support the transition to adulthood?paying
 for higher education, offering more attractive
 pay, and providing better housing, supports,
 and work hours for married couples. For
 vulnerable youth, the Fostering Connections
 to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of
 2008 extends the definition of a "child" up to
 age twenty-one and offers federal matching
 funds to states that opt to allow young people
 to remain in foster care past age eighteen. It
 also encourages states to provide that sup
 port in more constructive ways that facili
 tate mastery of the skills needed to become
 productive adults and lead independent lives.
 Similarly, the Edward M. Kennedy Serve
 America Act of 2009, as noted, expands and
 extends the work of the Corporation for
 National and Community Service. It more
 than triples (from 75,000 today to 250,000 by
 2017) the number of positions available each
 year for young people to engage in service
 learning opportunities in education, health,
 clean energy, economic opportunity, and
 other national priorities, thus providing a new
 rite of passage to adulthood in the way that
 military service did during the draft era. In
 the health care area, sweeping new legisla
 tion would offer health insurance options for
 all Americans, including young adults who
 have not yet connected with employer-based
 health insurance and who are not covered
 by college-based plans. Change is stirring in
 higher education as well. The Obama admin
 istration has proposed a bold, potentially
 transformative set of reforms and expansions
 in student grant and loan programs including
 significant increases in Pell Grant amounts,
 a $12 billion investment in community
 college facilities, accountability measures,
 instructional innovation, and programs?
 investments that would help these strategi
 cally placed institutions meet the needs of a
 twenty-first century student body.
 Taken as a whole, these developments signal
 an unusually bold set of initiatives and, most
 important, resources that would significantly
 help to relieve parental burden and drive key
 institutions to adapt to the changing needs
 of young adults in transition. But as is the
 case for all policy changes, the devil will be
 in the details of on-the-ground practice. The
 articles in this volume provide a blueprint for
 harnessing resources to need and policy to
 practice that could help to put derailed young
 people back on the pathway to adulthood in
 the twenty-first century.
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